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Jesse Paul Lehrke
The London Conference on Afghanistan – 
A New Strategy in Need of Further Specification
While security, governance and development, and
regional support in Afghanistan are intimately linked
concepts, the London conference addressed them
largely independent of each other and these three
areas will be discussed here in the same organiza-
tional manner.
Security
The first ambition of the conference related to
security was to  “consider how the respective roles of
the international and Afghan forces should evolve
over time”. Under this objective, further troop
contributions to the coalition forces were promised
as part of a ‘surge’ strategy. Simultaneously, the
Afghan Army will be increased from 104,000 to
171,000 and the Afghan Police from 96,800 to
134,000, enabling Afghan forces
to take over security responsi-
bilities province-by-province
basis. To ensure the quality of
these forces another aim of the
conference was to “encourage
Allies to increase their commit-
ments in critical areas such as
army and police training”.
While some new contributions were forthcoming,
given the proposed size of the Afghan forces, their
low combat capability, and high personnel turnover,
further contributions are being sought. When all the
above is combined with the lack of an Afghan
National Security Strategy and Policy, the task of
creating an integrated national security force ope-
rating under an appropriate unified doctrine is greatly
complicated.
The final ambition under the security heading was
to “address how to support Afghan-led efforts to
reintegrate former insurgents”. This ambition led to
the most controversial outcome of the conference:
“financial support for a Peace and Reintegration
Trust Fund, to offer economic alternatives to those
who renounce violence, cut links to terrorism and
agree to work within the democratic process”. The
lack of details about programme design has raised
numerous concerns. It is unclear whether pay-
ment(s) will be given directly to combatants who
sign up for the programme or whether the incen-
tives will be distributed as assets at a group level
through development projects. Economically and
ethically the latter option is preferred by most par-
ties but realistically concerns have been raised about
whether groups would be willing to sign up for such
a programme and also whether it could lead to inter-
group conflict over the ‘peace dividend’. Addition-
ally, it is not yet clear how the
plan will move from demobi-
lization of combatants to disar-
mament, which is difficult
given the security situation, and
subsequently to re-integration,
difficult given the economic
situation.
Governance and Development
One stated ambition of the conference regarding
governance and development was to “consider how
its [the international community’s] development
assistance supports Afghan leadership”. This state-
ment indicates that development projects will be
financed primarily based on how they contribute to
supporting the government in Kabul. This is not to
imply that the projects will not also have positive
economic and social impacts but that the primary
return on investment will be political. In support of
“Additionally, it is not yet clear how
the plan will move from demobiliza-
tion of combatants to disarmament,
which is difficult given the security
situation, and subsequently to re-
integration, difficult given the econo-
mic situation.”
The 28 January 2010 London conference on Afghanistan aimed “to move the international effort forward in three
key areas”: Security, Governance and Development, and Regional Support. The conference set out clear ambitions
in each of these areas and announced several new policies to meet these ambitions. How the broad policies agreed
at the conference can be transformed into executable programmes and identification of possible dangers for pro-
gramme implementation are the next steps that must be taken.
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this goal the proportion of development aid deliver-
ed through Kabul is to rise to 50% (from 20%) in the
next two years. This is intended to strengthen the
government by giving them more ‘carrots’ to offer
individuals and groups in exchange for support and
loyalty. It should also increase the desire for partici-
pation (direct and indirect) in the central govern-
ment due to its increased authority over dispersal of
funds. On the negative side, such state-led develop-
ment is often notoriously inefficient and wasteful,
even if one does not factor in corruption.
Given the above, the other 
stated ambition regarding
governance and development
was to  “agree concrete steps by
the Afghan authorities to tackle
corruption and improve finan-
cial management”. Improved
financial management was
elaborated on in the final communiqué to include
“attaining fiscal sustainability over time”. Currently
45% of Afghanistan’s GDP is from international aid
and, as a result, the vast majority of the government
budget comes from foreign sources. While the
Afghan government can be expected to attain more
taxation ability in time, it is unrealistic to assume the
Afghan state will be fiscally self-sufficient in the
near future. Given the resources available the size of
the public – and especially security – sector is un-
sustainable, and both are set to grow. Additionally,
reconciliation and power sharing require an over-
sized government bureaucracy and some dupli-
cation of positions and structures. It will be difficult
to simultaneously increase government resources
and personnel and change government structures
while also ensuring the incentive structure within
the government keeps the desire and opportunities
for corruption at a minimum.
Regional Support
The stated ambition regarding regional support was
to “promote progress towards more systematic
engagement by and between all regional stake-
holders”. This ambition was possibly the most diffi-
cult to attain and the final communiqué reflected
this, being as it was filled with political statements
and objectives with little concrete ideas on how to
attain these. Past projects, particularly between
Afghanistan and Pakistan, were cited with little plan
for their further development. The final communiqué
called for “more coherent and structured approach
to individual initiatives” and indicated this is a pri-
ority for the upcoming Kabul conference. Overall
the communiqué indicated that a shift from current
bi-lateral or tri-lateral arrangements to multi-lateral
arrangements was a priority.
The most significant disappointment regarding
regional support was the failure of Iran to attend the
conference, despite being invited to do so. However,
Iran has indicated a willingness to engage in region-
al initiatives in the future. Additionally, although
Russia constructively engaged
in the conference, they made
few concrete commitments.
On a more positive note, in his
opening remarks President
Karzai acknowledged the im-
portant roles that Saudi Arabia
and Turkey are playing to assist
in internal peace in Afgha-
nistan and regional cooperation respectively. These
countries’ engagement has served to bring other
countries and groups to the table that might not
have been willing, or invited, to participate in
Western–led initiatives. The final communiqué also
noted the significance of the European Union de-
cision to appoint a single High Representative to
Kabul.
Recommendations
The London conference has been rightly criticized
for having some shortcomings. However, the con-
ference was a high-level political gathering. As such,
while it aimed to provide guidelines on how to
improve security, governance and development, and
regional support in Afghanistan, it kept these broad
and left programme and policy elaboration for the
future. Based on the conference’s stated aims and
outcomes the following steps are recommends:
Security:
1. The EU should ensure that the Peace and
Reintegration programme is structured in lines with
the best practices established by experts in disarma-
ment, demobilization, and reintegration. Material
incentives should be asset (wealth), rather than
income, based and accompanied by vocational train-
ing. Concentration should be place on creating eco-
nomic linkages and dependencies between assets
held by possibly conflicting groups. Full disarma-
ment should be recognized as unattainable at this
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“It will be difficult to simultaneously
increase government resources and
personnel and change government
structures while also ensuring the
incentive structure within the govern-
ment keeps the desire and opportuni-
ties for corruption at a minimum.”
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time and should not be forced. While the offering of
ideological incentives should be left to the Afghan
government, the international community must
ensure Kabul honours its international treaty obliga-
tions and that they do not offer ideological conces-
sions that are inconsistent with international norms
and law.
2. Support should be given to the Afghan govern-
ment to produce a National Security Strategy and
Doctrine as soon as possible. While maintaining
respect for Western norms, the EU and NATO train-
ing missions should then incorporate this doctrine
in their training programmes and encourage others
to do the same.
Governance and Development:
3. Given the inherent weak-
nesses of state-led develop-
ment even greater attention
will be required to the timing
and sequencing of the anti-cor-
ruption programme, expansion
of the public sector, and the
influx of new funds. Despite the desire to rush these
three aspects, they should not be implemented
simultaneously. Given the EU’s vast experience in
just such development processes in the states of
eastern Europe, it can provide valuable technical and
monitoring of the same process in Afghanistan.
4. While the decision has been made to increase the
powers of Kabul, the provinces must not be for-
gotten as independent actors that must be tied to
each other as well as to the centre. Economic, social,
and political links between the provinces should be
encouraged. Furthermore, state-led development
should not be pursued to the exclusion of civil-
society actors and the EU should continue to work
with and support bottoms-up initiatives.
Regional Support:
5. The new EU High Representative should focus on
promoting regional cooperation and act as a media-
tor between parties. Despite the desirability of a
multi-lateral regional solution, given the difficulty of
attaining such an objective due to competing in-
terests, the EU should continue to nurture bi-lateral
or tri-lateral agreements of limited scope (single
issue agreements). These can be used to build confi-
dence between actors and simplify the environment,
paving the way for a larger multi-lateral agreement
at a later date. Additionally, the EU High
Representative should not be used as an alibi for less
involvement by individual European states.
Provided the EU states agree upon an overarching
framework to guide European policy, bi-lateral
engagement should not undermine the High
Representative’s mission and will give the EU mul-
tiple vectors from which to influence and monitor
the Afghan government.
6. Current Western efforts to encourage deeper
Russian involvement should continue, while being
aware of Russia’s historical sensitivity regarding
Afghanistan. Turkey, on the hand, could take the
lead in encouraging more and
positive Iranian involvement.
Finally, while this division into
the areas of security, governance
and development, and regional
support made the conference
agenda manageable and con-
tributed to ensuring agree-
ments could be reached, further
programme development in any one of these areas
must bear in mind the complex interdependency of
all three factors. The EU, with its integrated develop-
ment-security policies and instruments, can serve a
vital role in ensuring the larger and long-term picture
is kept in mind throughout the implementation of
the new strategy and that the “quick impact pro-
jects” of the past give way to sustainable solutions
for the future.
C·A·PERSPECTIVES · 1 · 2010 Page 3
“Despite the desirability of a multi-
lateral regional solution, given the
difficulty of attaining such an objec-
tive due to competing interests, the
EU should continue to nurture bi-
lateral or tri-lateral agreements of
limited scope (single issue agree-
ments).”
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